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Abstract
This paper has three goals. The rst, and perhaps the most important,
is to provide a new compilation of data on ethnic, linguistic and religious
composition at the sub-national level for a large number of countries. This
data set allows us to measure segregation of di¤erent ethnic, religious
and linguistic groups within the same country. The second goal is to
correlate measures of segregation with measures of quality of the polity
and policymaking. The third is to construct an instrument that helps to
overcome the endogeneity problem that arises because groups move within
country borders, partly in response to policies. Our results suggest that
more ethnically and linguistically segregated countries, i.e., those where
groups live more spatially separately, have a substantially lower quality
of government. In contrast, we nd no relationship between religious
segregation and the quality of government.
1 Introduction
Racial and religious conicts are often associated with poor politico-economic
performance, especially in developing countries. Economists have recently turned
their attention to ethno-linguistic fractionalization as an explanation of di¤er-
ences in the pace of development, starting with an inuential paper by Easterly
and Levine (1997). Since then, many others have shown how fractionalization
is negatively correlated with a host of policy variables, such as the quality of
government, indices of development, etc.1 However, many ethnically diverse
countries (the United States, for instance) are quite successful. What makes
We are grateful to Denis Chetverikov and Anna Savelyeva for excellent research assistance.
We also thank Roman Schibli, Artem Dzuba, and Galina Besstremiannaya for help with data
collection.
1See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a survey. For quality of government in particular,
see La Porta et al. (1999). Alesina and Glaeser (2004) show that redistributive policies are
less extensive in more fractionalized countries.
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di¤erent countries more or less capable of handling diversity or even of benet-
ting from it remains an open question.2
Due to lack of data, existing cross-country literature has never considered
the issue of segregation: that is, two hypothetical countries with, for example,
two equally sized groups would have the same fractionalization index (1=2) re-
gardless of how the groups are distributed geographically within the country,
from complete segregation (e.g., one group living in the northern half of the
country and the other in the southern half) to total integration (i.e., the mem-
bers of the groups are uniformly distributed throughout the country); yet one
should expect outcomes to vary with segregation.
The purpose of this paper is to ll this gap. More specically, our contribu-
tion is threefold: rst and perhaps most importantly, we present a new data set
on the composition of ethnic, linguistic and religious groups at the sub-national
(regional) level for a large number of countries (97 for ethnicity, 92 for language,
and 78 for religion).3 These data allow us to compute both an index of fraction-
alization and an index of segregation at the national level, as well as an index
of fractionalization at the sub-national level. We nd that the level of segre-
gation varies vastly across countries and the national-level fractionalization is
often di¤erent from subnational fractionalization. Second, we recognize that,
at least up to a point, the geographical distribution of groups is endogenous to
policy choices: populations move in response to national and local policies as
well as economic shocks. To cope with the endogeneity of segregation, we sug-
gest and compute an instrument based upon the composition of major groups
in bordering countries. More specically, we construct an index of predicted
segregation based on the idea that if the home country has a group that is also
present in a neighboring country, this group is likely to be concentrated near the
border of the two countries. Conversely, if the home country has a group not
present in any of the neighboring countries, that group is likely to be distributed
uniformly. Third, we relate our index of segregation to measures of the quality
of government. We nd that, controlling for fractionalization at the national
level and for the level of development, higher segregation in terms of ethnicity
and language is associated with signicantly lower quality of government. The
negative e¤ect of ethnic and linguistic segregation is especially large in democ-
racies. In contrast, there is no relationship between religious segregation and
the quality of government.
There are several possible and non-mutually-exclusive explanations for this
nding. One is that, if groups choose to live separately, they feel more animosity
towards each other and they disagree more on how to conduct public policies,
leading to a deterioration of the quality of government. Alesina, Baqir and
Easterly (1999) provide a model that relates the extent of disagreement among
individuals and the quality of their public policies. They show that the more
distant the preferences of di¤erent individuals and groups over public policies,
the lower the quality of the latter. Geographical concentration of ethnic groups
2For some discussion of whether democracy and/or development helps, see Alesina and La
Ferrara (2005).
3The precise denition of linguistic versus ethnic groups is given below.
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may also exacerbate ethnic voting(i.e., di¤erent ethnicities voting for candi-
dates who represent their group, regardless of their quality). This e¤ect would
hold only in democracies, and Banerjee and Pande (2007) show evidence from
India that ethnic voting reduces the quality of politicians. In some cases, geo-
graphical segregation may also lead to a threat of secession, putting additional
stress on the central government, which may then have to spend additional re-
sources on appeasement or repression rather than on productive public goods
and local governance.4 Geographical separation of groups may also exacerbate
conicts over allocation of public goods across regions and their nancing by
identifying the beneciaries of local public goods in terms of di¤erent ethnic
groups.
We are not aware of other papers on segregation in a cross-section of coun-
tries, since data on this variable have not been assembled. There is, of course,
a vast literature on segregation in US cities, which focuses on three issues: i)
measures of segregation (see Echenique and Fryer (2008) for a recent important
contribution), ii) explanations for the evolution of segregation (see, for instance,
Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999) and the references cited therein) and iii) the
e¤ect of segregation on the socioeconomic performance of minorities (for early
contributions, see Kain (1968); for more recent contributions, see Jenks and
Meyer (1990), Kain (1992), Cutler and Glaeser (1997) and Cutler, Glaeser and
Vigdor (2008)). There has been little research on the e¤ects of segregation on
the quality of government. An exception is La Ferrara and Mele (2006). They
consider the e¤ect of racial segregation in US cities (Metropolitan Statistical
Areas) and nd that more racial segregation has a positive impact on average
public school expenditure but leads to more inequality of school spending across
school districts.
The present paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data on
group composition at the sub-national level that we have assembled. Section
3 discusses the construction of indices of segregation using these data. Section
4 presents the correlations between segregation measures and the quality of
government. Section 5 presents our instrument for segregation and the results
of instrumental variables estimation of the e¤ect of segregation on the quality
of government. Section 6 discusses the robustness of the results; and the last
section concludes.
2 Data
We construct three data sets with ethnic, linguistic and religious composition
of sub-national administrative units (regions) in each country. We apply the
classication of groups used in Alesina et al. (2003), a paper that has produced
a widely used data set for fractionalization at the national level. That paper
extends the traditional ethno-linguistic fractionalization index based upon
the Atlas Narodov Mira, used by Easterly and Levine (1997) and many other
authors since, into its ethnic and linguistic components by focusing not only
4See Alesina and Spolaore (2003) for a discussion of secession threats and military spending.
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on linguistic di¤erences but also on other pertinent di¤erences between relevant
groups. Alesina et al. (2003) construct one index based exclusively on language
and another that combines a classication of language, self-reported ethnicity,
and physical features, primarily skin color.5
In most cases, people identify with a particular ethnic group based only upon
the commonality of their mother tongue; in these cases, ethnic and linguistic
groups coincide. In some countries, however, the use of separate classications
for language and ethnicity produces di¤erent levels of diversity. Consider the
US: according to a linguistic classication, whites and African Americans would
belong to the same group, but according to the ethnic index they would not,
since their skin colors are di¤erent. These two criteria make a lot of di¤erence
in other parts of the world as well. For instance, some Latin American countries
(e.g., Brazil and Ecuador) are much more homogeneous in terms of language
than in terms of ethnicity. This is because di¤erent ethnic groups such as whites,
mulattos and blacks speak the language of former colonizers (i.e., the Spanish
or Portuguese).
In the present paper, we consider the same three dimensions of diversity
as in Alesina et al. (2003): i) ethnicity, for which we have 97 countries, ii)
language, for which we have 92 countries, and iii) religion, for which we have
78 countries. The median number of groups is six for ethnicity and ve for
language and religion. The maximum number of groups within a country is
55 for ethnicity, 34 for language and 13 for religion. Note that each group is
treated identically; we make no attempt to measure the distance between
groups (i.e., the degree of di¤erence between di¤erent languages, ethnicities,
physical features or religions).6
Our geographical unit of observation is a region, i.e., a sub-national admin-
istrative unit of each country. For each region, we collected data on the total
population size and the fraction of the population that belongs to a certain
linguistic, ethnic or religious group. We drew data from the Census closest
to the year 2000 whenever its results were available. The second source of
data we turned to whenever census data were unavailable is the statistics pub-
lished by the national statistical o¢ ces of the countries. If neither of these two
sources were available, we relied on the regionally-representative Demographic
and Health Surveys (www.measuredhs.com). For the vast majority of countries,
at least one of these three sources was available. In a few cases, however, we
had to rely on the results of published demographics research. Table A.1 in the
Appendix describes in detail the data sources.
The quality of data available for the regional composition of groups varies by
country. Interestingly, it is often the case in this data set that data are better
for developing than for developed countries. For example, some countries in
5They use skin color to identify groups in the ethnicity component whenever this infor-
mation is available. When data on skin color are unavailable, groups are identied according
to self-identication of people into particular ethnic groups. By using additional sources,
they also expand on the number of countries in the Atlas. As data sources, they used the
Encyclopaedia Brittanica and the CIA Factbook.
6See Spolaore and Wacziarg (2007) on this question.
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Western Europe after WWII deliberately do not ask questions about ethnic
identity in their censuses. Therefore, we had to rely on information about the
birthplace of naturalized migrants and citizenship of non-naturalized migrants to
proxy for ethnic composition. We have classied countries into highand low
data quality (12 countries got a lowscore for quality of data on ethnicity; 3
for language and only one for religion). The results do not vary much between
the sample which includes all countries and the sample with high-quality data
only.
The rst consistency check on our data is as follows. For each country,
we started with our regional data and aggregated them to the national level.
We constructed the Herndahl index of fractionalization at the national level
for each country i and for each dimension of diversity, i.e., ethnicity, language,
and religion. The Herndahl index captures the probability that two randomly
drawn individuals in a certain country belong to di¤erent groups and is equal
to:
F i =
MiX
m=1
im(1  im)
where i indexes countries; m indexes groups and M i is the total number of
groups in the country i. im is the fraction of group m in the country i. Then,
we compared the resulting indices to the corresponding indices compiled by
Alesina et al. (2003) directly from the national-level data. The correlation
between the indices from the two data sources is very high. For language and
ethnicity, correlation coe¢ cients are above 0:9, and in the case of the high-
quality samples, they are 0:97. For religion, the correlation coe¢ cients are
slightly lower for both samples: namely, about 0:84.
Using our data, we can compute fractionalization indices of di¤erent regions
within countries. For each region j of country i we calculate the Herndahl
indices of fractionalization (F ij ) based upon our three dimensions of diversity.
The formula for regional-level fractionalization is as follows:
F ij =
MiX
m=1
ijm(1  ijm)
where i indexes countries (as above); j indexes regions; and ijm stands for the
fraction of group m in region j of country i.
In the data there is no obvious pattern in the relationship between national-
level and regional-level fractionalization indices. In some countries regional-level
fractionalization indices do not di¤er much from national-level fractionalization.
Of course, this is the case in very homogenous countries, such as Ireland and
Costa Rica in terms of linguistic composition. But, this also happens in very
fractionalized countries, such as Australia in terms of religion, where national
fractionalization is 0:77, whereas regional fractionalizations range from 0:72 to
0:78 with a standard deviation (SD) of only 0:02. Another example is Bolivia,
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which has an ethnic national fractionalization of 0:74 and regional fractionaliza-
tion indices ranging from 0:59 to 0:73 with an SD of 0:04. In other countries,
national fractionalization turns out to be a lot higher than all regional fractional-
izations, in other words, regions turn out to be a lot more homogenous than the
whole country. For example, national-level linguistic fractionalization in Nige-
ria is 0:42, while the largest regional fractionalization is only 0:22. Finally, it is
often also the case that a country has relatively small national fractionalization,
but some regions within it are very fractionalized. For example, in Colombia the
national linguistic fractionalization is 0:06 while regional fractionalization is 0:5
in Amazonas and Vichada regions (departments); similarly, the national reli-
gious fractionalization in Indonesia is 0:2, while regional fractionalization indices
are about 0:6 in the West Kalimantan and Maluku provinces. The great diver-
sity of the observed patterns suggests that the national-level fractionalization
index is hardly a su¢ cient statistic to describe diversity within countries.
3 Indices of Segregation
Based on information on the group composition in sub-national regions, we
construct an index of segregation which assumes a value of 1 if each group
occupies a separate region and therefore each region is fully homogeneous, even
though the country as a whole is fractionalized. The index assumes a value of
0 if each region has the same composition as the country as a whole.
Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) derive, summarize, and compare several al-
ternative indices of segregation. Based on their analysis, we dene our baseline
index of segregation for country i as follows:
Si =
1
M i   1
MiX
m=1
JiX
j=1
tij
T i
(ijm   im)2
im
where T i is the total population of country i and tij is the population of region
j in country i. J i is the total number of regions in country i. The rest of the
notation is as above. In particular, im is the fraction of group m in country i,
and ijm is the fraction of group m in region j of country i. To avoid cluttering
from now on, we drop the superscript i that indicates the country.
If each region is comprised of a separate group, then the index is equal to 1,
and this is the case of full segregation. If every region has the same fraction of
each group as the country as a whole, the index is equal to 0, and we take this
as the case of no segregation. S is increasing in the square deviation of regional-
level fractions of groups relative to the national average. It is usually referred
to as the squared coe¢ cient of variation. The index gives higher weight to
the deviation of group composition from the national average in bigger regions
than in smaller regions. Scaling by the total number of groups keeps the index
between 0 and 1.
S is dened for the full set of M groups. One important consideration in
applying this formula to the data relates to how to classify the othercategory:
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that is, in many regions of many countries, a certain share of the population is
not classied (i.e., classied as other). There are di¤erent ways of treating the
group (or non-group) other.The simplest but least appropriate would be to
treat this group as any of the identied groups. This is not satisfactory precisely
because the classication of other captures tiny groups or mixed groups. If
the group otherwere a clearly identiable homogenous group, it would most
likely be classied as such.
An alternative is to assume that the group othersis composed of a number
of distinct and small subgroups O that data availability does not permit us to
properly classify. Assume also that there is no segregation within the other
category, i.e., the subgroups of the othercategory are uniformly distributed
across all regions. Denote the number of identied groups by N . Then, under
these assumptions, one can rewrite the formula for the segregation index S as
follows:
bS = 1
N +O   1
0@ NX
m=1
JX
j=1
tj
T
(jm   m)2
m
+ So
1A
where
So =
JX
j=1
tj
T
(jo   o)2
o
o is the fraction of othersin the whole population and jo is the fraction of
others in the region j. Thus, in this case, the segregation index is equal to the
sum of the two components the segregation among identied groups and the
segregation of the other grouptreated as a single group (So) divided by the
total number of groups (N +O) minus one.7
In order to calculate bS, one needs to assess the number of subgroups within
the othercategory (O). It is reasonable to assume that none of the subgroups
in othersis larger than the smallest group that is explicitly classied. Thus,
we set the number of others subgroups O equal to the number of people in
othersdivided by the size of the smallest identied group. The rationale is
clear: the assumption is that the individuals who are not explicitly classied
into groups are those who belong to tiny groups that are missedby the census
or the national statistical o¢ ce precisely because they are small.8
Another approach would be to simply ignore the group other altogether
and redene the index of segregation for the N groups not dened as other.
In this case, segregation could be measured as follows:
eS = 1
N   1
NX
m=1
JX
j=1
tj
T
(jm   m)2
m
7 If one were to treat othersas a single homogenous group, the segregation index S would
be equal to N
N+O 1 bS.
8To get rid of a few outliers in terms of the number of subgroups of others (O), we cut
o¤ the distribution of O across countries at the 95th percentile, i.e., we redene O to be equal
to the 95th percentile of the distribution of O across countries when it is larger than the 95th
percentile of this distribution.
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Note that, under the assumptions underlying the distribution of others,
the index bS is a theoretically correct denition of segregation. In contrast,
the index eS is an approximation, since we are ignoring a certain share of the
population dened as other.9
Let us now describe how these indices of segregation apply to the actual data.
The rst thing to note is that the two indices bS and eS are very highly correlated:
0:96 for ethnicity, 0:80 for language, and 0:86 for religion. Figure 1 shows
the scatter plots of the two indices of segregation (i.e., eS and bS) for each of the
three dimensions of diversity. As one would expect, ethnic and linguistic segre-
gation indices are highly correlated; in fact, by construction, they are identical
in 46 countries. These are the countries in which people identify with ethnic
groups on the basis of language di¤erences. Correlation between segregation by
language or ethnicity, on the one hand, and by religion, on the other, is sub-
stantially lower, albeit also positive. (Figure 2 plots the segregation indices by
ethnicity, language, and religion against each other.) Countries appear to be
more segregated in terms of ethnicity and language than in terms of religion.
Segregation ranges from 0 to 0:39 in terms of ethnicity with a mean value of 0:10
and from 0 to 0:49 with a mean of 0:11 in terms of language; whereas religious
segregation ranges from 0 to 0:27 with a mean of 0:05 (all according to bS). As
shown in Figure 3, the indices of segregation are positively correlated with the
indices of fractionalization at the national level for ethnicity and language (with
pairwise correlation coe¢ cients of 0:42 and 0:36, respectively) and uncorrelated
for religion (with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0:01).
The most striking fact about segregation across countries is its relationship
with the level of development. Poor countries are on average twice as segregated
as rich countries in terms of all three dimensions of diversity. The mean value
of ethnic segregation is 0:11 for countries with per capita GDP below Slovenia,
which is often considered to be the poorest rich country; in contrast, the mean
of ethnic segregation is 0:04 for countries with per capita GDP above or equal to
Slovenia; for linguistic segregation the corresponding gures are 0:12 vs. 0:07;
and for religious segregation 0:05 vs. 0:02. The very few rich countries which
are ethnically highly segregated are Spain, Belgium, Israel and Switzerland and
none of them are among the ten most segregated countries. Arguably, three
of the four of these countries face the most di¢ cult ethnic conicts within the
developed world. The most religiously segregated rich countries are the Nether-
lands, Israel, and Japan and their rank among all countries is below 17. It
would appear that the ability or willingness to reduce segregation is increasing
in GDP per capita. Correlation coe¢ cients of log per capita GDP with ethnic,
linguistic, and religious segregation are  0:35,  0:23, and  0:31, respectively.
Controlling for per capita GDP and fractionalization (both of which are cor-
related with segregation, as we point out), Latin American countries are on
average the most ethnically and linguistically segregated and the least segre-
gated in terms of religion. Interestingly, there are no signicant di¤erences in
9Since
PN
m=1 m 6= 1 and N < M , both the numerator and the denominator in eS are
smaller than in S.
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the level of segregation between Africa and Asia. Transition countries are less
segregated than non-transition countries in terms of ethnicity and language,
while they do not di¤er terms of religious segregation.
Table 1 shows the most and the least segregated countries along with their
segregation and fractionalization coe¢ cients. In the Appendix, we report sum-
mary statistics for segregation indices (Panel A of Table A.2), and the table of
correlations between di¤erent indices (Table A.3).10
4 Correlation: Segregation and Governance
We now look at the correlation of our measures of segregation with what are, by
now, standard measures of the quality of government, namely, the World Banks
Governance Indicators: Voice and accountability, Political stability, Government
e¤ectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, and Control of corruption. The
data, detailed denitions and sources for each of these variables are presented at
http://www.govindicators.org (see also Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton
1999, 2002 and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2006).
Di¤erent governance indicators are very highly correlated with each other.
Therefore, it is virtually impossible to disentangle di¤erent dimensions of the
quality of government in a cross-section of countries. Throughout the analysis we
carry all six governance indicators with us, knowing well, however, that each one
of them is not truly an independent observation. In Table 2, we present pairwise
correlation coe¢ cients between the quality of government indicators and our six
measures of segregation (bS and eS for language, ethnicity and religion). All of the
correlation coe¢ cients are negative, and their magnitude is quite high (i.e., more
segregation, lower quality of government); in some cases, correlation exceeds 0:5
in absolute value. This is not surprising, however, considering that the quality
of government goes hand-in-hand with the level of development and the level of
fractionalization.
Therefore, we are primarily interested in establishing whether segregation
is associated with governance conditional on fractionalization and the level of
development. To study partial correlations, we run simple OLS regressions of
the following form:
Qi = + Si + Fi +X
0
i + "i
where i indexes countries, Q stands for a governance indicator; S and F are
segregation and fractionalization indices, respectively; X is a vector of additional
covariates (described below); and " is a heteroscedastic error. We run these
regressions separately for the three dimensions of diversity: ethnicity, language,
and religion.
In Table 3, we present results for the rule of law as dependent variable
and bS as the measure of segregation. First, consider regressions in which the
10To conserve space, in each of these tables, in addition to the indices of segregation we
summarize the instruments used for these indices. The instruments are described below in
the Section 5.
9
right-hand side includes only the indices of segregation and fractionalization
(the results are presented in columns (1), (3) and (5)). For all dimensions of
diversity, the index of segregation in these regressions enters negatively with the
coe¢ cient statistically di¤erent from 0, at least at the 5% level of condence.
The index of fractionalization is also negative and signicant in regressions for
ethnic and linguistic diversity, while it is positive and marginally signicant for
religion. The results on fractionalization are in line with ndings by Alesina
et al. (2003). Religious a¢ liation can be forcedupon individuals. In many
countries, religious freedom is limited or non-existent, and therefore, a high level
of religious homogeneity is articially imposed by law, and this may especially
be the case in badforms of government.11
Columns (2), (4) and (6) add a set of regressors standard in the literature
(e.g., La Porta et al. 1999 and Treisman 2000). The most important one is, of
course, log of GDP per capita, since measures of institutional development and
government quality are highly correlated with per capita income. We also con-
trol for log population size, democratic tradition, and two geographical variables:
latitude (a common control for adverse climate conditions) and a measure of the
extent to which countrys surface is covered by mountains. We added mountains
to the list of covariates because, on the one hand, the level of segregation may
depend on physical constraints to mobility and, on the other hand, harsh terrain
may make government policies less e¤ective. We also add legal origin dummies
to the list of controls following the insights by La Porta et al. (1999). Finally,
in order to capture Weberian ideas, we control for the shares of main religions
in the population (see, for instance, La Porta et al. 1997). Denitions of control
variables, their sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables A.2 and
A.4.
Ethnic and linguistic segregation continues to be negatively (and signi-
cantly, at the 1% level) associated with the rule of law after the inclusion of
control variables (columns (2) and (4)); whereas the coe¢ cient on religious seg-
regation becomes small and statistically insignicant. Fractionalization loses
signicance in all regressions with control variables. It is, in particular, the
inclusion of GDP per capita that makes the index of fractionalization insignif-
icant in this regression, a result consistent with La Porta et al. (1999). Note,
however, that whether or not one wants to control for GDP per capita in these
types of regressions is debatable, since per capita income may be endogenous to
ethnic fractionalization and segregation. In any case, our index of segregation
remains signicant even after controlling for GDP per capita. As for the con-
trol variables, with the exception of GDP per capita and democratic tradition,
none of the controls is statistically signicant consistently across regressions;
the legal origin variables, however, are jointly signicant. Figure 4 illustrates
the relationship between segregation indices and the rule of law with residual
scatter plots conditional on all covariates.
In Tables 4 and 5, we report abbreviated results of the same regressions as in
11The same problem may apply to forced linguistic and ethnic assimilation, but it is less
common.
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Table 3 for all the quality of government indicators. We show the results for the
segregation indices bS; the OLS results for eS are almost identical and available
upon request. Each table has three panels. The rst two panels report results
of regressions with all control variables (Panel A) and with fractionalization and
segregation indices as the only regressors (Panel B). Panel C presents results
for a subset of countries which excludes dictatorships, dened as countries with
an average Polity IV democracy score less than one for the years 1975-2004.12
Not surprisingly, the pattern of results obtained for the rule of law in Table
3 generalizes to all the other quality of government indicators. Let us discuss
ethnic and linguistic diversity rst. Fractionalization is signicant only in regres-
sions without control variables. In contrast, measures of linguistic and ethnic
segregation have a statistically signicant negative coe¢ cient in regressions both
with and without controls. There are a couple of exceptions: in the full sam-
ple with all controls, coe¢ cients on segregation are insignicant for regulatory
quality for both ethnicity and language and for government e¤ectiveness for
ethnicity. In the sub-sample of democracies, the results on ethnic and linguistic
segregation are stronger: the coe¢ cients are larger in absolute value while stan-
dard errors are approximately the same as in the full sample. The coe¢ cients
on segregation in the sub-sample of democracies are statistically signicant in
regressions for all governance indicators. The result that segregation is more
strongly associated with the quality of government in the sample of democracies
does not depend on the denition of democracy.13
As for the case of religious diversity, religious segregation is not associated
with any measures of the quality of government once control variables are in-
cluded; whereas coe¢ cients on religious fractionalization are positive and in
approximately one half of regressions statistically signicant. In section 6, we
discuss the robustness of our results with respect to excluding inuential ob-
servations and including additional covariates that may a¤ect both segregation
and the quality of government.14
12The Polity IV democracy score is the democ variable taken from
www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2006.xls.
13For example, the results are just as strong for the substantially more restrictive denition
of democracy adopted in Persson and Tabellini (2003).
14An alternative measure of segregation that we came across is a so-called relative di-
versity: R = 1
F
PM
m=1
PJ
j=1
tj
T
(jm   m)2. The relationship between R and S is as
follows. Dene segregation of a particular group m as Sm =
PJ
j=1
tj
T
(jm m)2
m
. Then,
R =
PM
m=1 !
R
mSm and S =
PM
m=1 !
S
mSm, where !
R
m =
m
1 PM
k=1
k
2 and !
S
m =
1
M 1 . If
groups are equal in size, R = S because !Sm = !
R
m. If groups have di¤erent sizes, R gives a
higher weight to segregation of larger groups, whereas S gives equal weight to segregation of
all groups. Correlation of segregation measures based on the formula for R with the quality of
government is negative but much weaker than that of S. This has a theoretical underpinning:
segregation in smaller groups has an important e¤ect on the quality of government by means
of a¤ecting the relationship between minorities and majorities. This e¤ect is ignored in R. In
the rest of the paper, we focus on S as a measure of segregation.
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5 Causal Inference: the E¤ect of Segregation
5.1 Description of the instrument
The level of segregation depends upon where people live, and this choice is en-
dogenous to politico-economic forces. Certainly, major events like civil wars,
revolutions or large regional economic shocks may lead to massive migrations.
People may also move in response to more minorevents, such as changes in
the level of local taxation or public goods (Tiebout 1956). How much people
actually move in response to changes in local policies can be debated. For ex-
ample, in many developing countries, individuals face serious economic barriers
to mobility. If the quality of government (and, in particular, rule of law) is very
low at the national level, ethnic and religious groups may choose to live closer
together to provide local public goods such as security, order, and socioeconomic
infrastructure in a more homogeneous environment with higher social capital.
This gives rise to a reverse causality going from the quality of government to
segregation.
We propose and compute an instrument for segregation which relates spatial
distribution of groups in a country to the composition of major groups present in
neighboring countries. In a nutshell, we make a prediction about the location of
people belonging to each group in each country, assuming that people belonging
to a particular group gravitate towards the borders of countries that are
populated by people from the same group. Based on the predicted location of
members of each group, we construct an index of predicted segregation, which
we use as an instrument for the actual segregation.
The idea behind predicting the location of groups is as follows: If a par-
ticular group in the home country is also present in one of the neighboring
countries, it is likely that this group will live closer to the border with the coun-
try populated by the same group. Conversely, if a group in the home country
is not present in any of the neighboring countries, it is less likely to concentrate
near any particular border and, therefore, will be spread more uniformly across
the country. Note that this could be due to a natural historical formation of
borders cutting across large areas populated by a particular ethnic or religious
group (e.g., the border drawn between Austria and Italy after WWI that left
a German-speaking population in the Tyrolean part of Northern Italy). This
could also be due to a gradual spread out of a particular language or religion
across borders (e.g., adopted from colonizers or missionaries). But it also could
be due to an awkward drawing of borders that split groups into two adjoining
countries (e.g., in many African states).15
An example in Figure 5 illustrates the basic logic of the instrument. Consider
a home country HC1 with four groups, A;B;C and D. Suppose that this
15See MacMillan (2003) for an excellent discussion of this kind of problem created by the
1919 Treaty of Versailles, which redesigned the worlds borders after WWI. The idea of a
wrongborder splitting an ethnic group into two neighboring countries underlies the empir-
ical work on articial states by Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2006). We discuss the
relationship between our instrument and various measures of articial states in detail in
section 6.
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country has four neighboring countries, all fully homogeneous and populated by
each one of the four groups. The predicted segregation of HC1 would be 1, since
each of the four groups of the home country would cluster near the border of the
neighboring country populated by the same group. Consider now another home
country HC2 with the same groups but surrounded by four countries without
any members of groups A;B;C or D. In this case, the predicted segregation
of the home country would be 0, since the four groups in the HC2 have no
gravitationto any of the borders.
The procedure for calculation of the predicted segregation index is as follows.
Let the home country have K neighboring countries, assume that it is divided
intoK hypothetical regions. We construct a predicted distribution of people into
these hypothetical regions, assuming that members of each group gravitate
towards those regions that border countries where their own group constitutes
a larger share of the population. Finally, we calculate the predicted index of
segregation on the basis of this predicted distribution and use it as an instrument
for segregation. Note that the sizeof a hypothetical region is its population
share, and since the segregation index does not depend on population density,
the borders of these K hypothetical regions are inconsequential.
The calculation of predicted distribution takes several steps. First, we match
all groups in each home country to the majorgroups in the neighboring coun-
tries. The question of which groups in two neighboring countries match is
often not so simple. We have adopted a mechanical procedure based upon the
denition of groups.16 We dened a majorgroup as a group with size greater
or equal to 10% of the countrys population. Majorgroups are unlikely to be
formed due to cross-border migrations from the home country. Thus, our focus
on the major groups corrects for the possibility of relatively small cross-border
migrations and makes the instrument less likely to be contaminated by the poli-
cies of the home country. The key assumption required for excludability of our
instrument is that the quality of government in the home country does not a¤ect
major groups in the neighboring countries. Obviously, a state collapse leading
to a massive cross-border migration would cause problems for our instrument,
but this is a very rare event.
As the second step, we construct the predicted distribution of groups in the
home country across hypothetical regions. Let tmk be the number of people
from group m predicted to be located in the hypothetical region k of the home
country. If none of the neighboring countries has group m as one of its major
groups, people from groupm are divided equally among all hypothetical regions.
Formally,
tmk = 
HC
m T
HC 1
K
where HCm is the fraction of group m in the home country; T
HC is the home
countrys total population; and K is the total number of neighboring coun-
tries and, thus, of hypothetical regions. In the case when at least one of the
16Yet even the most mechanical matchingprocedure in some countries calls for judgment.
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neighboring countries has group m as a major group, we predict the following
distribution:
tmk = 
HC
m T
HC 
k
m
KX
j=1
jm
(1)
where km is the fraction of group m in the neighboring country that borders
hypothetical region k. Therefore, 
k
mP
j 
j
m
has a simple interpretation of the force
of gravity, which is increasing in the fraction of group m in the neighboring
country k relative to the fractions of groupm in the other neighboring countries.
It is easy to see that if fractions of group m in all neighboring countries are the
same, the predicted number of people from group m will be the same in each
region. If only one neighboring country has groupm among its major groups, the
whole groupm of the home country is predicted to be located in the hypothetical
region bordering this country. Note that we ignore the neighboring countries
with population smaller than one hundredth of the size of the home country
on the grounds that they should have little gravity. This eliminates from the
calculation such neighboring states as San Marino for Italy, Liechtenstein for
Switzerland, and Andorra for Spain.
Figure 6 illustrates how the predicted distribution of groups across hypo-
thetical regions is constructed using the example of the religious composition of
Switzerland. Switzerland has Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Jewish, and non-
religious populations. It has borders with France, Germany, Austria, Italy, and
Liechtenstein. Since Liechtenstein is too small to have any gravity force, we di-
vide Switzerland into four hypothetical regions, i.e., F , G, A, and I named after
the rst letter of the respective (large enough) neighboring country. Germany is
the only country neighboring Switzerland with Protestants as a major religious
group; therefore, we predict all of the Switzerlands protestant population (37%
of the total population) to be located in the region G. Italy, Austria, and France
have sizable not religious populations, while the share of non-religious popula-
tion in Germany is below 10% and, therefore, it is not a major group. Thus, we
predict that the non-religious population of Switzerland will be divided between
regions I, A, and F according to the relative shares of non-religious populations
in Italy, Austria, and France (5% of the total population in region I, 3.5% in
region A, and 3% in region F ). We predict Catholics to be located in all four
hypothetical regions, as they form a major group in all the neighboring states.
Region I is predicted to have the largest number of Catholics because the frac-
tion of Catholics in Italy is higher than in the other neighboring countries. Since
Muslims, Orthodox Christians, and Jews do not form a major group in any of
Switzerlands neighbors, we predict members of these groups to be located in
all hypothetical regions in equal proportions.17
17 In Section 6, we discuss the robustness of our results to alternative assumptions behind
the construction of predicted distribution of groups across hypothetical regions.
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The outlined procedure yields a predicted distribution of groups among hy-
pothetical regions, which has, however, an important undesirable property. The
population size of the individual hypothetical regions is not restricted in any way
(apart from the fact that the sum of regional populations equals the population
of the home country). As a result, in some countries, predicted population of
some hypothetical regions may be very small and uniform. This happens when
a tiny group s of the home country is matched to a major group in one of the
neighboring countries k and no other group from the home country is matched to
any other group in the neighboring country k, at the same time, all other groups
in the home country are matched with groups in other neighboring countries. In
this case, the segregation index on the basis of this predicted distribution will
be very high because the tiny group s will be the only group in the hypothetical
region k and it will be perfectly segregated so that no other hypothetical region
will have members of group s.
In reality, regions are su¢ ciently large that none of the tiny groups can form
a homogenous region and segregation of tiny groups does not have a large e¤ect
on the segregation indices. Thus, we introduce a lower bound to the population
size of hypothetical regions. We postulate that the share of the population of
any hypothetical region cannot be smaller than the average of the shares of
the smallest real regions across countries, namely, 2.7% of the total countrys
population. Therefore, as the next step, we augment the predicted distribution
of groups across hypothetical regions. If a hypothetical region has a predicted
size smaller than the lower bound, we re-settlepeople from other hypothetical
regions that are bigger than the threshold to this region proportionally so that
each person in the sending regions has equal probability to be re-settled. In
other words, we increase the population of the smallest region to reach the lower
bound, so that the populations of all bigger regions decrease, but the fractions
of di¤erent groups in each of these other regions remains constant. If none of the
hypothetical regions have predicted population less than the critical value, we
do not augment the predicted distribution. The number of countries in which
re-settlementoccurs is: 18 for ethnicity; 19 for language; and 10 for religion.
The median number of hypothetical regions with too small populations is 1 for
ethnicity and religion and 3 for language; the mean number is between 2 and 3
for all dimensions of diversity. Finally, we calculate the predicted segregation
indices eS and bS using the resulting predicted distributions. For all countries
which have no neighbors, e.g., islands, or have just one neighbor, e.g., Portugal
and Denmark, we set eS and bS to be zero, as our logic predicts the distribution of
all groups to be uniform. The indices of predicted segregation are summarized
in Panel C of Table A.2.
Does predicted segregation have the power to predict actual segregation?
Table A.3 presents unconditional pairwise correlations between segregation in-
dices and the instruments: they are always positive and range between 0.3 and
0.6. However, in order for predicted segregation to serve as an instrument for
the actual segregation, it has to have su¢ cient predictive power conditional on
all covariates. Table 6 reports the results of the rst stage regressions of the
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form:
Si = + S
p
i + Fi +X
0
i + "i
where Spi is a measure of predicted segregation. Panel A presents rst stage
results for bS and Panel B for eS. For both measures of segregation, bS and eS, the
instrument is a strong (and signicant) predictor of the actual segregation. The
instrument has a higher predictive power for index bS than for eS. Figure 7 shows
residual scatter plots of the predicted versus actual segregation conditional on
covariates (the measure used for the plots in the left column is bS and in the
right column  eS). The last two columns in each of the panels of Table 6 report
F-statistics for the excluded instrument (Spi ).
18 They are su¢ ciently high forbS. In the case of eS, in some regressions the instrument is weak; particularly,
this is the case for the linguistic diversity. This happens because of one outlier -
the US. The US is the only country for which the predicted segregation is equal
to one (in the case of linguistic diversity), as the Spanish-speaking population
is predicted to reside next to Mexico, while the English-speaking population is
predicted to reside next to Canada (the only two countries bordering the US by
land). We address the problem of weak instrument for eS in Section 6.
5.2 Results
In Tables 7, 8, and 9, we present the results of the second stage regressions forbS. These tables are organized in the same way as OLS tables 3, 4, and 5, respec-
tively. Table 7 displays the full regression output for the rule of law outcome in
regressions with all controls and with no controls except for fractionalization.
As with OLS, in 2SLS regressions, the coe¢ cient on segregation is negative and
signicant at the 5% level in the second stage for ethnicity and language when
all controls are included, whereas religious segregation is insignicant. Table 8
shows that ethnic and linguistic segregation has a negative signicant e¤ect on
all governance indicators without exception in the sample of democracies, and
with just a couple of exceptions (voice for ethnicity; and regulatory quality and
control of corruption for language) in the full sample. The e¤ect of religious
segregation disappears once control variables are included in contrast to the ef-
fects of ethnic and linguistic segregation. Figure 8 illustrates the second stage
relationship with residual scatter plots.
To understand the size of the e¤ect of segregation on governance, consider the
example of linguistic diversity. In the full sample, a move from perfect linguistic
segregation to a perfect intermix, which is equivalent to a change of about 9
standard deviations (SDs), leads to improvements in the indices of political
stability of about 3 points (= 3:4 SDs), voice of 2.5 points (= 2:6 SDs), the
rule of law of about 2 points (= 2 SDs), and government e¤ectiveness of 1.6
18We report these F-statistics calculated both under the assumption of heteroscedastic and
homoscedastic ", even though the latter is certainly an incorrect assumption. The reason for
reporting both is that the theory of weak instruments, which generated the cut o¤ points for
the weak instruments, is developed only for the homoscedastic case (see, for instance, Stock
et al. 2002).
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points (= 1:6 SDs). The e¤ect of ethnic segregation is a little higher for all
governance indicators, with the exception of voice. In addition, in the sample
which excludes autocracies, the magnitude of the e¤ect of ethnic and linguistic
segregation is larger than in the full sample for all governance indicators with the
exception of political stability index. The magnitude of coe¢ cients on ethnic
and linguistic segregation in the 2SLS regressions is consistently higher than
that of OLS. This could be due both to the endogeneity of segregation and to
measurement error.
All the 2SLS results that we have described are for bS measure of segregation.
For ethnic and religious dimensions of diversity, the results of the second stage
are very similar both in terms of magnitude and statistical signicance when
we consider eS instead of bS. For linguistic diversity, however, the results of the
second stage in the case of eS are weaker in terms of statistical signicance with
the same magnitude of coe¢ cients. The main di¤erence is as follows: segregation
is signicant for three instead of four outcomes (voice, political stability, and
the rule of law). The results for eS are available from the authors.
6 Sensitivity
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our results.
6.1 Articial states
Our main identication assumption, i.e., exclusion restriction, is as follows: the
predicted segregation calculated based on information on group composition of
neighboring states is unrelated to home country outcomes (and, particularly,
the quality of government) other than through its relationship with the home
countrys actual segregation. Yet, one could argue that in many African coun-
tries, borders were drawn by colonizers without paying much attention to the
historical location of di¤erent ethnic groups and some of these borders cut right
across them (Alesina et al. 2006). On the one hand, as Alesina et al. (2006)
argue, this colonizers disregard to the local conditions must have had a direct
e¤ect on such countrys outcomes as government quality. On the other hand,
it is also related to predicted segregation, as it yields a situation in which the
same ethnic group resides in the two neighboring countries.
We conduct several exercises to verify that our results do not depend on so-
called articial states.In particular, we try to control directly for the measures
of articial borders suggested by Alesina et al. (2006). The rst measure of
articial borders is a measure of how straight the country border is (note that
many African countries have borders which are straight lines). The variable
is described in detail in Alesina et al. (2006). This variable is uncorrelated
with either actual or predicted segregation. Our results are una¤ected by the
inclusion of this control variable (both in terms of magnitude and statistical
signicance of the e¤ect segregation and the predictive power of the instrument).
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The second measure of articial borders used by Alesina et al. (2006) is
the share of the home countrys population which belongs to ethnic groups also
represented in neighboring countries which are likely to form the same nation.
Alesina et al. (2006) matchethnic groups across borders just as we do in order
to construct our instrument. There is one important di¤erence in our approach
and that of Alesina et al. (2006). While matching groups across borders they
make a judgement on whether a certain group present on both sides of a border
can potentially make a single nation, e.g., they do not consider groups having the
same skin color or the same language in Latin America as the same group. Our
approach to matching groups across borders is a more mechanical one and we
match groups across borders on the basis of all available characteristics. Thus, in
order to check whether our results are driven by the presence of articial states
we conduct two additional tests. First, we control for the second measure of
articial borders constructed by Alesina et al. (2006). Alternatively, we control
for the share of ethnic, linguistic, and religious populations that match across
borders according to our own mechanical criterion. Note that in addition
to truly articial states these measures depict also the states which were
formed naturally but have representatives of the same groups in neighboring
countries. As one would expect, these variables are positively correlated with
our predicted segregation.19 Nevertheless, our results are robust to controlling
for the share of home countrys population which is represented in neighboring
states irrespective of which matching criteria are applied. The only notable
di¤erence between the results with and without these control variables is in the
F-statistics for the excluded instrument from the rst stage, they do drop once
each of these control variables is included. Nonetheless, for the bS measure of
segregation, they still remain su¢ ciently strong not to worry about weakness of
the instrument.
6.2 Additional covariates and di¤erent samples
We have made a number of additional robustness checks to make sure that our
results are not driven by an omitted variable. In particular, we included the
following covariates which potentially could vary systematically with the level
of segregation and the quality of government: 1) dummies for large geographical
areas, i.e., East Asia and Pacic, South Asia, Europe and Central Asia, Latin
America and Caribbean, North America, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-
Saharan Africa; 2) a dummy indicating whether a country is a former colony; 3)
the share of countrys population living in urban areas (this could be important
since group mixing is more likely in the cities and, at the same time, countries
with higher urbanization usually are more developed); 4) a dummy indicating
countries surrounded by water (this control could be important because by
construction our instrument always predicts zero segregation for such countries);
19Note that the predicted segregation is more highly correlated with the shares of par-
titioned groups calculated based on our own matching compared to correlation with the
Alesina et al. (2006) measure as predicted segregation is zero if there are no groups matched
across the borders.
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5) a measure of the extent to which a country is covered by rivers or other in-
land bodies of water and the standard deviation of the elevation within country
borders (as both rivers and mountains a¤ect the costs of mobility); and 6) the
share of population which belongs to the other group (as it a¤ects the bS
instrument and could be related to the quality of statistics, which, in turn, may
be related to the overall quality of government). The results of both the OLS
and IV regressions are practically una¤ected by inclusion of these additional
covariates.
We checked that our results do not depend on the quality of the data on
the sub-national group composition: we re-ran all regressions for the sample of
countries with good-quality data, and the results are robust. We also veried
that the results are robust to the exclusion of OECD countries and/or transition
countries from the sample as well as controlling for OECD and transition country
dummies.
6.3 Inuential observations
The results are robust to the exclusion of any one particular country from the
sample. The two most inuential observations (which a¤ect the results in favor
of our story) are Chile (which has low ethnic segregation and very high quality
of government conditional on other covariates) and Zimbabwe (which has very
high ethnic segregation and low government quality). If we exclude both Chile
and Zimbabwe from the sample, the results become weaker. Nonetheless, in the
sample that excludes dictatorships, the coe¢ cient on ethnic segregation remains
statistically signicant for government e¤ectiveness, the rule of law, and control
of corruption in IV regressions and for voice, political stability, the rule of law
and control of corruption in the OLS regressions. Moreover, Chile and Zimbabwe
have a countervailing force in the second stage regressions for ethnic diversity:
Bulgaria and Russia are very inuential observations, but they work against our
story. Excluding Bulgaria (which has a relatively high quality of government
and an extremely high predicted ethnic segregation) and Russia (where both
predicted ethnic segregation and the quality of government are low) strengthens
the negative e¤ect of ethnic segregation on government quality.
Linguistic segregation also has a statistically signicant negative e¤ect on
voice, political stability, the rule of law and control of corruption in the OLS
regressions without Chile and Zimbabwe. But the instruments become weak in
the second stage. Yet, once we exclude the USA the most inuential observa-
tion in the rst stage in addition to Chile and Zimbabwe, the instrument for
language becomes strong enough, and then the statistically signicant results
are obtained in the second stage regressions for voice and political stability. We
conclude that the e¤ect of segregation cannot be explained by the presence of
outliers.
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6.4 Instrument
We have also examined the sensitivity of the results to our instrument by ex-
perimenting with di¤erent ways of constructing it. First, we recalculated it
taking into account tiny states such as San Marino and Liechtenstein and got
almost exactly the same results. Second, we constructed an instrument which
treats a border with an ocean (or sea) as an additional neighbor with no gravity
force, i.e., as if the ocean were another neighboring country with none of the
home country groups represented. And again, we got very similar results to
the baseline.20 Third, we tried to construct the predicted segregation of groups
across hypothetical regions in which the gravity force is based on the relative
number of people in each group in neighboring countries instead of the relative
fractions of groups (i.e., taking the population size of neighbors into account).
In particular, the gravity force parameter from the equation 1 was replaced by
kmT
kP
j 
j
mT j
, where T k is the total population of the neighboring country k. The
results for language are the same, while the results for ethnicity are statistically
weaker both in the rst and in the second stage. Nonetheless, in the second
stage, the results remain statistically signicant for political stability, govern-
ment e¤ectiveness and the rule of law.
It is important to note that for the vast majority of countries, the baseline
instrument is very similar to all other versions of the instrument that we tried.
But there are a few exceptions. The list of the countries for which there are
large di¤erences in the prediction of segregation between the baseline and at
least one of the alternative approaches is as follows: Argentina, Austria, Brazil,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Israel, Jordan, Latvia, Mexico, Morocco, Saudi Arabia,
and Spain. We re-estimated the 2SLS regressions excluding these countries from
the sample and the results turned out to be robust. Despite the reduction in
the sample size, the rst stage works well for bS and the second stage yields
the following results. Linguistic segregation has a negative signicant e¤ect
on voice, political stability, government e¤ectiveness and the rule of law (and
on all outcomes without exception in the sub-sample of democracies); while
ethnic segregation has a negative signicant e¤ect on political stability and
government e¤ectiveness. (Control of corruption is also signicant, but only in
the sub-sample of democracies.) In addition, we estimated all our instrumental
variable regressions with Generalized Method of Moments instead of 2SLS and
got very similar results with stronger statistical signicance.
We also considered the weakness of the eS instrument. As we already men-
tioned, the strength of the predictive power of the instrument for language
segregation measured by eS strongly depends on the inclusion of the US in the
sample. As the scatter plot in the middle row of Figure 7 shows, the US is a
very inuential observation in the rst stage: it has very high predicted segre-
20The main di¤erence between the results is that the instrument which takes the sea border
into account has a better predictive power in the case of language (because the predicted
segregation decreases for the USA and becomes much closer to what it actually is); and it has
worse predictive power in the case of ethnicity (because the predicted segregation for Brazil
increases substantially and becomes a very poor predictor of the actual Brazils segregation).
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gation, while its actual segregation is not that high. The US is the only country
with predicted segregation measured by eS equal to one, as all of the English-
speaking population is predicted to be located in the north next to Canada,
and all the Spanish-speaking population is predicted to be located in the south
next to Mexico. If one excludes the US from the sample, F-statistics for theeS instrument for language rise to over 20, while the coe¢ cient on linguistic
segregation in the second stage remains negative and statistically signicant for
voice, political stability, and the rule of law.
7 Conclusions
This paper achieves three goals. First, it has provided a new data set on compo-
sition of ethnic, linguistic and religious groups at the sub-national level for about
90 countries which can be used to study a wide variety of politico-economic
questions previously out of reach for an empirical researcher. Second, it has
suggested an instrument for segregation in a country based on the composition
of groups in the home and neighboring countries. Third, it has shown that
more ethnic and linguistic segregation is associated with signicantly lower gov-
ernment quality, holding fractionalization constant both in the OLS and 2SLS
regressions. The e¤ect of ethnic and linguistic segregation on the quality of
government is stronger in a subset of democracies. The results are robust to
inclusion of an extensive list of controls, alternative denitions of segregation,
and exclusion of inuential observations.
Thus, our results show that if two countries have the same level of fraction-
alization at the national level, quality of government is lower in the more ethni-
cally segregated country, i.e., in the country where di¤erent ethnic groups live
relatively more apart. Several arguments may explain this nding, and future
research may investigate the channels more precisely, either with cross-country
studies or by focusing on specic countries. One argument is that groups liv-
ing apart do not develop a commonality of goals and views that would allow
better policymaking. Also, geographic concentration of groups may exacerbate
ethnically- and geographically-based suboptimal policies at the expense of good
governance at the national level. Ethnic voting may be easier to organize and
may favor the selection of politicians on the basis of geographic and ethnic char-
acteristics, rather than quality. In some cases, secession threats may force the
central government to focus on repression or appeasement, subtracting resources
from more productive use.
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Figure 1: Segregation indices S˜ and Ŝ
24
AFG
ARM
AUS
AUT
BELBEN
BFA
BGD
BGR
BLR
BLZBOL
BRA
CAF
CAN
CHE
CHL
CHN
CIV
CMR
COL
CRI
CZE
DNK
ECU
ESP
EST
ETH
FIN
GAB GBR
GHA
GIN
GTM
HND
HRVHUN
IDN
IND
ISL ITAJPN
K Z
KEN
KGZ
KHORLSO
LTU
LVA
MAR
MEX
MKDLI
MWI
NER
NORNPL
NZL
PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
PRT
PRY
ROM
RUS
RWA
SAU
SE
VKVNSWE
TGO
TJK
TUR
TZA
UGA
UKR
USA
UZB
VNM
ZAF
ZMB
ZWE
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
e
th
ni
cit
y
se
gr
eg
at
io
n
(S
ha
t)
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
language segregation (S hat)
ARM AUSAUT
BEN
BFA
BGD
BGR
BLZ
BRA CAF
CAN
CHECHL
CIV
CMRCZEEST
ETH
GAB GBR
GHA
GIN
GTM
HRV
HTI
HUN
IDN
IND
JPN
KAZ
KEN
KGZ
KHM
KOR LTU
MEXMLI MOZ
MUS
MWI
NAM
NER
NGA
IC
NPL
NZL
PAK
PERPHLPRTPRY
ROM
RUS
RW
SENSVKSVN
TGO
THA
TUR
TZA
UGA
USA
UZB
VNM ZAF
ZMB
ZWE
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
re
lig
ion
se
gr
e
ga
tio
n
(S
ha
t)
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
language segregation (S hat)
ARM AUSAUT
BEN
BFA
BGD
BGR
BLZ
BRA CAF
CAN
CHECHL
CIV
CMRCZEEST
ETH
GABGBR
GHA
GIN
GTM
HRV
HUN
IDN
IND
IRL
ISR
JPN
KAZ
KEN
KGZ
KHM
KOR
LKA
LTU
MEXMLIMWI NER
NLD
NPL
NZL
PAK
PERPHLPRTP Y
QATROM
RUS
WA
SENSVKSVN
TGO
TUR
TZA
UGA
USA
UZB
VNM ZAF
ZMB
ZWE
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
re
lig
ion
se
gr
e
ga
tio
n
(S
ha
t)
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
ethnicity segregation (S hat)
Figure 2: Segregation indices along the three dimensions of diversity
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Figure 3: Segregation and fractionalization indices
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Figure 4: Residual scatter plots for rule of law and segregation (OLS)
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Figure 7: Predictive power of the instrument conditional on all controls
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Figure 8: Residual scatter plots for the rule of law and segregation (second stage of 2SLS)
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Table 3: Segregation and the rule of law, OLS regressions
Rule of law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Segregation Ŝ (ethnicity) -2.50*** -1.42***
[0.72] [0.47]
Fractionalization (ethnicity) -1.20*** 0.02
[0.28] [0.22]
Segregation Ŝ (language) -1.84** -1.34***
[0.71] [0.44]
Fractionalization (language) -1.00*** 0.23
[0.33] [0.22]
Segregation Ŝ (religion) -4.53*** -0.25
[1.33] [0.99]
Fractionalization (religion) 0.76* 0.41
[0.42] [0.25]
ln (population) -0.02 -0.03 -0.05*
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
ln (GDP per capita) 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.39***
[0.06] [0.07] [0.06]
Protestants share 0.007** 0.005 0.003
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Muslims share 0.002 0.001 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Catholics share -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Latitude 0.28 0.60 0.82
[0.46] [0.49] [0.58]
English legal origin 0.22* 0.15 0.12
[0.12] [0.15] [0.14]
German legal origin 0.38** 0.27 0.35*
[0.16] [0.19] [0.18]
Socialist legal origin -0.40** -0.49** -0.34
[0.19] [0.22] [0.23]
Scandinavian legal origin -0.07 -0.06 0.00
[0.26] [0.34] [0.00]
Democratic tradition 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.09***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
Mountains 0.05 0.19 0.03
[0.16] [0.17] [0.20]
Constant 0.79*** -3.98*** 0.53*** -4.09*** -0.2 -3.21***
[0.17] [0.78] [0.20] [0.74] [0.18] [0.67]
Observations 97 97 92 92 78 78
R-squared 0.24 0.87 0.15 0.87 0.12 0.84
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 6: First stage: Segregation and predicted segregation
Panel A: Segregation index Ŝ
Full sample; All controls Full sample; No controls Democ sample; All controls
E Ŝ L Ŝ R Ŝ E Ŝ L Ŝ R Ŝ E Ŝ L Ŝ R Ŝ
Instrument 0.46*** 0.33*** 0.23*** 0.49*** 0.32*** 0.25*** 0.52*** 0.32*** 0.27***
[0.12] [0.10] [0.07] [0.12] [0.07] [0.07] [0.13] [0.11] [0.06]
Fract-n 0.11** 0.15*** -0.01 0.13*** 0.15*** -0.01 0.08* 0.13*** 0.01
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.05] [0.05] [0.03]
Obs. 97 92 78 97 92 78 77 75 64
R-squared 0.52 0.44 0.53 0.39 0.31 0.34 0.59 0.41 0.61
F-stat (het) 15.32 10.72 11.36 17.04 18.28 14.96 15.11 8.13 20.38
F-stat (hom) 28.31 18.75 26.97 33.21 23.22 38.64 35.72 15.64 24.94
Panel B: Segregation Index S˜
Full sample; All controls Full sample; No controls Democ sample; All controls
E S˜ L S˜ R S˜ E S˜ L S˜ R S˜ E S˜ L S˜ R S˜
Instrument 0.33*** 0.21* 0.20*** 0.35*** 0.20** 0.21*** 0.40*** 0.2 0.25***
[0.12] [0.12] [0.06] [0.12] [0.09] [0.06] [0.14] [0.14] [0.06]
Fract-n 0.18*** 0.26*** 0.02 0.20*** 0.29*** 0.01 0.15*** 0.26*** 0.03
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.02] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04]
Obs. 97 92 78 97 92 78 77 75 64
R-squared 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.34 0.36 0.25 0.55 0.50 0.56
F-stat (het) 7.22 3.16 10.66 8.31 5.30 13.08 8.58 2.05 14.42
F-stat (hom) 11.64 8.59 19.79 13.84 9.37 24.92 16.45 6.17 21.42
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. “F-stat (het)” reports F-statistics for the excluded instrument from the
first stage under the assumption of heteroscedasticity; and “F-stat (hom)” – under the assumption of
homoscedasticity. “E” – ethnicity; “L” – language; “R” – religion.
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Table 7: Segregation and the rule of law, the second stage of the 2SLS regressions
Rule of law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Segregation Ŝ (ethnicity) -3.88** -2.46***
[1.75] [0.67]
Fractionalization (ethnicity) -0.97** 0.17
[0.38] [0.25]
Segregation Ŝ (language) -1.14 -1.92**
[2.08] [0.74]
Fractionalization (language) -1.11*** 0.32
[0.42] [0.23]
Segregation Ŝ (religion) -6.65** -0.91
[2.92] [1.87]
Fractionalization (religion) 0.76* 0.43*
[0.43] [0.24]
ln (population) -0.01 -0.02 -0.05
[0.03] [0.03] [0.04]
ln (GDP per capita) 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.39***
[0.07] [0.08] [0.06]
Protestants share 0.01* 0.005 0.002
[0.00] [0.003] [0.003]
Muslims share 0.003 0.001 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Catholics share -0.001 -0.003 -0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Latitude 0.2 0.64 0.76
[0.47] [0.50] [0.58]
English legal origin 0.21 0.12 0.12
[0.13] [0.16] [0.14]
German legal origin 0.35** 0.2 0.35*
[0.17] [0.21] [0.19]
Socialist legal origin -0.44** -0.54** -0.31
[0.19] [0.24] [0.23]
Scandinavian legal origin 0.02 -0.11 0
[0.29] [0.37] [0.00]
Democratic tradition 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.09***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
Mountains 0.1 0.24 0.01
[0.17] [0.19] [0.20]
Constant 0.84*** -4.11*** 0.49** -4.18*** -0.1 -3.24***
[0.18] [0.84] [0.22] [0.78] [0.20] [0.66]
Observations 97 97 92 92 78 78
R-squared 0.23 0.87 0.15 0.87 0.10 0.84
F-stat (het) 17.04 15.32 18.28 10.72 14.96 11.36
F-stat (hom) 33.21 28.31 23.22 18.75 38.64 26.97
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** signif-
icant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. “F-stat (het)” reports F-statistics for the excluded instrument from
the first stage under the assumption of heteroscedasticity; and “F-stat (hom)” – under the assumption of
homoscedasticity.
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A Data Appendix
Table A.1: Sources of data on group composition
Country Ethnicity Language Religion
Afghanistan Lang NSO (www.mrrd.gov.af) .
Argentina INDEC (www.indec.mecon.ar) . .
Armenia Census (www.armstat.am) Census (www.armstat.am) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Australia Lang Census (www.abs.gov.au) Census (www.abs.gov.au)
Austria NSO (www.statistik.at) NSO (www.statistik.at) NSO (www.statistik.at)
Bahrain Census (www.bahrain.gov.bh) . .
Bangladesh NSO (www.bbsgov.org) Ethn NSO (www.bbsgov.org)
Belarus Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) .
Belgium Lang www.eurolang.net .
Belize Census
(www.statisticsbelize.org.bz)
Census
(www.statisticsbelize.org.bz)
Census
(www.statisticsbelize.org.bz)
Benin DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Bolivia Census (www.ine.gov.bo) Census (www.ine.gov.bo) .
Brazil Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu)
Bulgaria Census (www.nsi.bg) Census (www.nsi.bg) Census (www.nsi.bg)
Burkina Faso DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Cambodia Lang Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu)
Cameroon DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Canada Census (www.statcan.ca) Census (www.statcan.ca) Census (www.statcan.ca)
Central African Rep. DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Chile Census (www.ine.cl) Ethn Census (www.ine.cl)
China Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Ethn .
Colombia Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Ethn .
Costa Rica Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) .
Cote D’Ivoire DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Croatia Census (www.dzs.hr) Census (www.dzs.hr) Census (www.dzs.hr)
Czech Rep. Census (www.czso.cz) Ethn Census (www.czso.cz)
Denmark Council of Europe report Ethn .
Dominican Rep. . . DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Ecuador Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) .
Egypt . . DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Estonia Census (http://pub.stat.ee) Census (http://pub.stat.ee) Census (http://pub.stat.ee)
Ethiopia DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Finland Lang NSO (www.stat.fi) .
France INED, Population, 2004
(www.ined.fr)
. .
Gabon DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Germany NSO (www-ec.destatis.de) . .
Ghana DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Greece NSO (www.statistics.gr) . .
Guatemala DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Guinea DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Haiti . DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Honduras Census (www.ine-hn.org) Ethn .
Hungary Census (www.nepszamlalas.hu) Census (www.nepszamlalas.hu) Census (www.nepszamlalas.hu)
Iceland NSO (www.statice.is) Ethn .
India DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Indonesia Census (www.bps.go.id) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Census (www.bps.go.id)
Iran . . NSO (www.sci.org.ir)
Ireland Census (www.cso.ie) . Census (www.cso.ie)
Israel NSO (www1.cbs.gov.il) . NSO (www1.cbs.gov.il)
Italy NSO (www.dossierimmigrazione.it) NSO (www.dossierimmigrazione.it) .
Japan Census (www.stat.go.jp) Ethn Census (www.stat.go.jp)
Jordan Census (www.dos.gov.jo) . .
Kazakhstan NSO (http://en.government.kz) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Kenya DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Korea NSO (www.kosis.kr) Ethn NSO (www.kosis.kr)
Continued to the next page
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Continued from the previous page
Country Ethnicity Language Religion
Kyrgyzstan DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Latvia NSO (www.csb.lv) NSO (www.csb.lv) .
Lesotho Lang DHS (www.measuredhs.com) .
Lithuania NSO (www.stat.gov.lt) Ethn NSO (www.stat.gov.lt)
Macedonia NSO (www.stat.gov.mk) Ethn .
Madagascar . . DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Malawi Lang NSO (www.nso.malawi.net) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Mali DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Mauritius . NSO (www.gov.mu) NSO (www.gov.mu)
Mexico Census
(http://censos.ccp.ucr.ac.cr)
Census
(http://censos.ccp.ucr.ac.cr)
Census
(http://censos.ccp.ucr.ac.cr)
Morocco Lang Census (www.statistic-hcp.ma) .
Mozambique . DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Namibia . Census
(www.npc.gov.na/census/index.htm)
DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Nepal Census (www.cbs.gov.np) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Netherlands NSO (www.cbs.nl) . NSO (www.cbs.nl)
New Zealand Census (www.stats.govt.nz) Census (www.stats.govt.nz) Census (www.stats.govt.nz)
Nicaragua . Census
(http://censos.ccp.ucr.ac.cr)
Census
(http://censos.ccp.ucr.ac.cr)
Niger NSO (www.stat-niger.org/) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Nigeria . DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Norway Census (http://statbank.ssb.no) Ethn .
Pakistan Lang Census (www.statpak.gov.pk) Census (www.statpak.gov.pk)
Panama Census
(http://censos.ccp.ucr.ac.cr)
Ethn .
Paraguay Census (http://www.dgeec.gov.py) Census (http://www.dgeec.gov.py) Census (http://www.dgeec.gov.py)
Peru DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Census (www.inei.gob.pe/) Census (www.inei.gob.pe/)
Philippines Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu)
Portugal NSO (www.sef.pt) Ethn NSO (www.sef.pt)
Qatar Census (www.planning.gov.qa) . Census (www.planning.gov.qa)
Romania Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu)
Russia Census (www.perepis2002.ru) Census (www.perepis2002.ru) Census (www.perepis2002.ru)
Rwanda DHS (www.measuredhs.com) NSO (www.statisticsrwanda.gov.rw) NSO (www.statisticsrwanda.gov.rw)
Sao Tome . . Census (www.ine.st)
Saudi Arabia NSO (www.cds.gov.sa) Ethn .
Senegal DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Slovakia Census (http://portal.statistics.sk) Ethn Census (http://portal.statistics.sk)
Slovenia Census (www.stat.si) Census (www.stat.si) Census (www.stat.si)
South Africa Lang Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu)
Spain Lang Centro De Investigaciones Sociolog-
icas (www.cis.es)
.
Sri Lanka NSO (www.statistics.gov.lk) . NSO (www.statistics.gov.lk)
Sweden NSO (www.ssd.scb.se) Ethn .
Switzerland Lang Piguet, E. and Wanner P., Popula-
tion Studies 31, 2000.
Piguet, E. and Wanner P., Popula-
tion Studies 31, 2000.
Taiwan NSO (http://eng.dgbas.gov.tw) . .
Tajikistan NSO (www.stat.tj) Ethn .
Tanzania DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Thailand . Census (web.nso.go.th) Census (web.nso.go.th)
Togo DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Turkey Multu, Servet (Int. J. Middle East
Stud., 28, 1996)
Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Uganda NSO (www.ubos.org) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Ukraine Census (www.ukrcensus.gov.ua) Census (www.ukrcensus.gov.ua) .
United Kingdom Council of Europe report Council of Europe report Council of Europe report
Usa Census (www.census.gov) Census (www.census.gov) Census (www.census.gov)
Uzbekistan DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Vietnam Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Ethn Census (www.ipums.umn.edu)
Zambia DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Zimbabwe Lang DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Note: “NSO” – National Statistical Office; “DHS” – Demographics and Health Survey. “Lang” means
that language data were used for ethnicity and “Enth” means that ethnicity data were used for language.
This happens when there are no independent sources of regional-level data for language and ethnicity and, at
the same time, national-level statistics on ethnic and linguistic diversity coincide. More detailed information
about the data sources is available from the authors upon request.
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Table A.2: Summary statistics
variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Panel A: Segregation and Fractionalization Indices
Segregation (ethnicity) S˜ 97 0.12 0.12 0 0.49
Segregation (ethnicity) Ŝ 97 0.10 0.11 0 0.39
Segregation (language) S˜ 92 0.16 0.14 0 0.56
Segregation (language) Ŝ 92 0.11 0.11 0 0.49
Segregation (religion) S˜ 78 0.06 0.06 0 0.28
Segregation (religion) Ŝ 78 0.05 0.06 0 0.27
Fractionalization (ethnicity) 97 0.37 0.27 0 0.92
Fractionalization (language) 93 0.36 0.27 0 0.89
Fractionalization (religion) 78 0.43 0.24 0 0.83
Panel B: Dependent and control variables
Voice and accountability 109 0.07 0.93 -1.63 1.54
Political stability 109 -0.11 0.88 -2.26 1.48
Government effectiveness 109 0.13 1.00 -1.46 2.29
Regulatory quality 109 0.15 0.86 -2.12 1.67
Rule of law 109 0.05 1.00 -1.68 2.07
Control of corruption 109 0.06 1.06 -1.41 2.47
ln (population) 109 16.41 1.57 11.84 20.95
ln (GDP per capita) 109 8.53 1.20 6.27 10.41
Protestants share 109 12.96 22.38 0 97.80
Muslims share 109 19.61 33.04 0 99.40
Catholics share 109 34.09 36.76 0 96.90
Latitude 109 0.32 0.20 0 0.72
English legal origin 109 0.25 0.43 0 1
French legal origin 109 0.44 0.50 0 1
German legal origin 109 0.06 0.23 0 1
Socialist legal origin 109 0.21 0.41 0 1
Scandinavian legal origin 109 0.05 0.21 0 1
Democratic tradition 109 4.86 3.62 0 10
Mountains 109 0.28 0.26 0 0.94
Panel C: Instrumental variables
Predicted S˜ (ethnicity) 97 0.08 0.11 0 0.49
Predicted Ŝ (ethnicity) 97 0.06 0.10 0 0.47
Predicted S˜ (language) 92 0.12 0.19 0 1
Predicted Ŝ (language) 92 0.09 0.15 0 0.86
Predicted S˜ (religion) 78 0.11 0.15 0 0.79
Predicted Ŝ (religion) 78 0.09 0.14 0 0.75
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Table A.4: Sources of control variables
Variable Definition
ln (Population) Natural log of population in the country. Average for the years 1995-2004. Source:
World Development Indicators 2006.
ln (GDP per capita) Natural log of GDP in constant 2000 international dollars per capita. Average for
the years 1995-2004. Source: World Development Indicators 2006. For initial value
of GDP per capita we use natural log of GDP in constant 2000 international dollars
per capita. Average for the years 1975-1980. Source: World Development Indicators
2006.
Religion Identifies the percentage of the population of each country that belonged to the three
most widely spread religions in the world in 1980. For countries of recent formation,
the data is available for 1990-95. The numbers are in percent (scale from 0 to 100).
The three religions identified here are: (1) Romanic Catholic; (2) Protestant; and
(3) Muslim. Source: La Porta et. al. (1998). Original sources: World Christian
Encyclopedia 1982, Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations 1995, Statistical Abstract of
the World 1995, Demographic Yearbook 1995, CIA World Factbook 1996
Legal origin Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of each country.
There are five possible origins: (1) English Common Law; (2) French Commercial
Code; (3) German Commercial Code; (4) Scandinavian Commercial Code; and (5)
Socialist/Communist laws. Source: La Porta et. al. (1998). Original sources: CIA
World Factbook 1996.
Latitude The absolute value of the latitude of the country, scaled to take values between 0 and
1. Source: La Porta et. al. (1998). Original source: CIA World Factbook 1996
Democratic tradition Democracy score index. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower values indicating a less demo-
cratic environment. Average for the years 1975-2004. Source: Polity IV Project:
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2006.
Fertility Fertility rate (births per woman). Average for the years 1975-2004. Source: World
Development Indicators 2006.
Investment Investment share as % of GDP. Average for the years 1975-2004. Source: Penn World
Table 6.2.
Openness Export plus Import as % of GDP. Average for the years 1975-2004. Source: Penn
World Table 6.2.
Mountains Measure of mountains in the country. Source: William Easterly’s data.
Colonial origin Identifies countries that were colonized by a Western overseas colonial power since
1700 for at least 10 years. Source: Teorell and Hadenius (2005).
Region Identifies the region where the country is situated. There are six possible regions:
(1) East Asia and Pacific; (2) Europe and Central Asia; (3) Latin America and
Carribean; (3) Middle East and North Africa; (4) North America; (5) South Asia;
and (6) Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: World Bank.
Island Identifies countries that are situated on islands and therefore have no bordering coun-
tries. Source: CIA World Factbook 1996
OECD Identifies countries that are currently members of OECD. These countries are Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom, USA. Source: wikipedia.org.
Transition Identifies transition countries. These countries are Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Macedonia, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Source: wikipedia.org.
Partitioned Percent of the population of each country that belongs to groups partitioned by the
border. Source: Alesina et. al. (2006).
Squiggliness Log of basic fractal index based on World Vector Shoreline Dataset (GIS format).
This variable measures squiggliness of each country’s border. Source: Alesina et. al.
(2006).
Elevation Standard deviation of elevation of each country in meters. Source: GIS dataset.
Rivers Share of area of the country covered by large perennial bodies (rivers, lakes, seas).
Source: GIS dataset.
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